ReBuild Ukraine: powered by de-risking neoliberalism

por Olena Lyubchenko

On April 21, 2022, only two months after Russia’s invasion, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, issued a decree establishing the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War. As Russia was making rapid advances in the Donbas region and periodically shutting down the Nord Stream gas pipelines to place pressure on Europe, the first draft of Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan was published in July 2022, with the slogan, ‘a strong European Ukraine is a “magnet” for international investment’. That same month, Switzerland hosted the Ukraine Recovery Conference, in Lugano, as the international kick-off event for the recovery process. The Lugano conference emphasised that in the spirit of Europeanisation, Ukraine’s recovery ‘has to be inclusive and ensure gender equality and respect for human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Recovery needs to benefit all, and no part of society should be left behind. Disparities need to be reduced’.¹ At numerous official meetings and in the media, the reconstruction of Ukraine’s war-torn economy has been celebrated as nothing short of a new ‘Green Marshall Plan’.

Since July 2022, Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction has become a new global industry, with the World Bank estimating it could exceed US $486 billion over the next decade.²The devastating effects of Russia’s invasion, coupled with the Zelensky government’s labour and social reforms aimed at reducing social costs, has created favourable conditions for capital, particularly for the financial sector. The planned reconstruction effort will serve US and EU interests, including those of financial conglomerates like BlackRock, Ukrainian elites, and Western and Ukraine-based energy companies. As is usually the case, impoverished Ukrainian households will likely bear the costs of both the war and the recovery. Yet this is only part of the story.

The most underexamined aspect of Ukraine’s post-war recovery is the reconfiguration of the role of the post-Soviet state as a ‘de-risking’ entity for predominantly foreign finance capital. While the original Marshall Plan was implemented in the context of comprehensive Soviet social citizenship, rooted in strong state intervention and offering an alternative to capitalist development, Ukraine’s reconstruction today occurs in the context of what economist Daniella Gabor terms the Wall Street Consensus.³This paradigm assigns the state a new role: to de-risk investments on behalf of finance capital by providing extraordinary guarantees and securities to the multinational firms invited to finance, reconstruct, and manage public infrastructure, resources, and services. Ukraine offers an especially attractive target due to its lingering, if diminished, post-Soviet state capacity, economic landscape, and residual public assets. And the war provides a timely opportunity for restructuring. In war-torn Ukraine, de-risking neoliberalism arrives as a Europeanising agenda aiming to further ‘de-communise’ state structures through state-capacity grabbing. This implies not just neoliberal austerity for impoverished Ukrainian households, but also a political restructuring of the state-capital relationship, towards the interests of predominantly foreign finance capital.

Ukraine’s energy sector, heavily damaged by Russian attacks, has become a prime area for de-communisation, capital accumulation, and EU markets. Though many Ukrainians have been experiencing energy poverty since the post-Soviet collapse and especially following February 2022, energy is listed as a highly investible, priority sector in the Ukraine Recovery Plan. Will domestic public resources – or whatever is left of them – be directed towards ensuring predictable returns for investors? My analysis explores this question based on my observations at the ReBuild Ukraine Powered by Energy conference (Warsaw, November 2023). I posit that Ukraine’s Soviet-era energy infrastructure – remarkably strong in gas storage, electricity generation, and green hydrogen potential – presents significant opportunities for capital. Under the logic of the Wall Street Consensus, applied in blended finance schemes and a political-advisory role for foreign finance capital, this infrastructure can support Europe’s shift away from Russian fossil fuels while generating profits for energy conglomerates and investors. These gains, however, come at the cost of privatising Ukraine’s energy sector, a remnant of Soviet-era subsidisation policies, and shifting the state’s political role to one that delegates public policy objectives to private capital. We are witnessing a brutal war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives being turned into a speculative opportunity: one that promises enormous profits through the undermining of social rights, and obstructs the development of alternative political visions for a just transition in post-war Ukraine.

The post-Soviet state

To assess the post-war reconstruction industry in Ukraine, and how it is transforming the Ukrainian state, it is essential to start with the contours of the post-Soviet capitalist state in the context of neoliberal globalisation. Ukraine was one of the more politically and economically privileged Soviet republics, industrially developed, highly educated, and rich with natural resources.⁴ In 1990s post-Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet state – its resources, institutions, infrastructure – was transformed into a support system for new capital. As Steven Solnick emphasises, the Soviet state did not just fall apart; rather, the former nomenklatura (state officials and Soviet enterprise managers) were ‘stealing the state itself’.⁵ The restructuring involved three processes: (1) state-owned enterprises and the public sphere were directly transformed into private sources of income; (2) Soviet state institutions, legal resources, and apparatuses formed the infrastructure for capital accumulation; and (3) Shock Therapy reforms, like elimination of price controls, introduction of flat tax, and cutbacks in social benefits and services, aimed to discipline the workforce into new dependence on the market. In this sense, the criminal-political nexus that emerged in Ukraine attached to big industry must be traced back to the late-Soviet state, as Yulia Yurchenko has shown.

Ukraine’s market-reform program really got going by 1994. Following Leonid Kuchma’s election victory, his program was passed by parliamentary vote in October 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, under Yuriy Yekhanurov, who headed the State Property Fund of Ukraine, and with the help of the IMF, neoliberal reforms were passed that included trade liberalisation, price liberalisation by 72%, mass privatisation, pre-arranged tenders driven by political calculations, and grain liberalisation.⁶ Kuchma,⁷ like Yeltsin in Russia, passed privatisation through presidential decrees to circumvent stalling in parliament and political resistance. Over this period, the IMF provided US $3.5 billion to Ukraine, making it the third-largest recipient of USAID assistance after Israel and Egypt in 1995 and 1996. USAID assisted Ukraine not just financially, but also in the drafting of laws.

Neoliberal reforms were nothing short of a disaster for Ukraine. The country’s official GDP collapsed by almost half between 1990 and 1994. During this period, Volodymyr Ishchenko and Yulia Yurchenko note, Ukraine became a neoliberal kleptocracy, characterised by the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) and priority development areas (PDAs), with priority sectors for industries and legislative reform on tender, state purchasing, and abuse of procedure. Two competing power blocs came to dominate Ukrainian politics, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk, both Soviet-era industrial centres. The Dnipropetrovsk (now Dnipro) bloc was composed of the aforementioned neo-nomenklatura, as well as capitalists in-the-making from the milieu of the criminal–political nexus and Komsomol, represented by Presidents Kravchuk, Kuchma, and Prime Minister Lazarenko in the first post-independence period. The Donetsk bloc, led by figures like President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Azarov, gained power by privatising state assets and concentrating capital. By the late 1990s, the Donetsk faction formed the Party of Regions to solidify its influence. What is often seen as ‘two Ukraines’ – pro-Western and pro-Russian – is better understood, as Yurchenko argues, in terms of shifts in power within and between social blocs and classes. This kleptocratic rivalry over the politics of post-independence Ukraine culminated in the 2014 financial crisis, EuroMaidan, and the separatist movement in Donbas. The effect has been to further de-develop the country. In 2019, the GDP per capita in Ukraine remained below its 1989 level. As Volodymyr Ishchenko and Oleg Zhuravlev argue, Ukraine’s EuroMaidan uprising responded to, reproduced, and intensified what they term the post-Soviet crisis of hegemony.⁸

The Ukrainian post-Soviet state is hollowed-out and fragile. It went through Shock Therapy reforms in the 1990s, the so-called ‘de-communisation’ reforms since 2014, and of course a war. Now, Russia’s war potentially offers foreign finance capital a unique state capacity and economic landscape, with residual public assets such as energy. In this scenario, the state provides guarantees and securities to finance capital, and thereby increases returns relative to risks. As Daniela Gabo puts it, the state comes to ‘de-risk’ investment through instruments such as public-private partnerships. This development strategy, the Wall Street Consensus, is an update of neoliberalism. Gabor explains that it consists of ‘long-term contractual arrangements through which the private sector commits to finance, construct and manage public services as long as the state, with multilateral development bank (MDB) support via blended finance, shares the risks by guaranteeing payment flows to PPP operators and investors’.⁹ In the case of Ukraine, not only is foreign finance capital arriving to invest in new ‘spaces’, but it does so with state guarantees to take on the risks of investing during a major war.

Ukrainian energy

Historically, post-Soviet Ukraine’s energy market was designed to maintain state control while subsidising household and public-sector energy consumption. In 2002, an IMF policy discussion report complained that ‘the Ukrainian government continues to place a heavy bureaucratic and regulatory burden on the private sector… the tax authorities maintain wide powers’.¹⁰ Governance issues in corporate management, as well as a number of enterprises being blocked from privatisation (such as regional energy-distribution companies and telecommunications companies like Ukrtelecom), led to rent-seeking behaviour that blocked some market-liberalisation reforms. In 2011, Ukraine became a member of the European Energy Community, which required major reforms as a condition of entrance, including the imposition of market prices for households. Coal, the only resource in which Ukraine was self-sufficient, is largely located in Donbas, in areas now controlled by Russia. After the 2014 Maidan and the separatist movement in Donbas, Ukraine became import-dependent in energy. Despite this, reforms towards a liberalised energy market with unsubsidised energy prices for households were stalled, due to popular unrest that threatened the government’s legitimacy.

On the same day that Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, Ukraine disconnected from the Soviet-era power grid that linked it to the Russian and Belarusian electricity systems and began a three-day process to connect to the Continental European grid. By November 2023, Ukrenergo, the Ukrainian transmission system operator, achieved compliance with the key technical requirements for a permanent interconnection between the power systems of Continental Europe and Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion has severely impacted Ukraine’s electricity industry, including the renewable sector, since 30% of Ukraine’s solar capacities and 90% of its wind power capacities are now in Russian-occupied territories.¹¹ While Ukraine has banned the use of Russian energy domestically, it continues to facilitate the transit of Russian oil and gas to Europe, remaining committed to this as long as Europe needs. In The Ukraine 2023 Report, the European Commission on EU enlargement made the following demands of Ukraine:

advance green energy transition and green reconstruction: adopt an ambitious national energy and climate plan (NECP) in line with the 2030 Energy Community energy and climate targets […] adopt and implement the electricity integration package; continue improving energy efficiency including in the residential sector through regulatory measures and via the Energy Efficiency Fund; implement policy measures to encourage investments in renewable energy production; launch reform of the district heating sector, and introduce mandatory energy efficiency criteria for public procurement

take steps to achieve cost reflective energy pricing, in particular by gradually phasing out public service obligations and replacing them with targeted support for vulnerable energy consumers

improve the independent and effective functioning of the energy regulator, resulting in a track record of fair and transparent decision-making to enable the energy markets to function properly¹²

Abandoning subsidies for households, eliminating the state’s role in the energy sector, and liberalising the energy market were proclaimed as central elements of a green transition and a necessary part of Europeanisation. In practice, for Ukrainian households, this could mean that electricity will be limited to only five to seven hours a day this coming winter – worsening energy poverty during the war.

ReBuild Ukraine Powered by Energy, Warsaw 2023

Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction industry has its own elite international conference circuit, including the bi-annual ReBuild Ukraine Powered by Energy: International Exhibition in Warsaw.¹³ This trade-fair-style event involves international financial institutions, donors and investors, Western governments and development agencies, as well as Ukrainian banks and local and regional governments that pitch and make investment deals. Whether the conference itself is a place of important decision-making, or only a ceremonial performance, burnished with slick PowerPoint presentations, of deals already made behind closed doors, it is revelatory of the policies and investment strategies that will guide Ukraine towards a future envisioned by global financial elites.

The conference underscored that Ukraine’s alignment with the European Green Deal is essential for European sovereignty. Its strategic value is rooted in the ‘de-communisation’ of the strong post-Soviet infrastructural and manufacturing capacity in Ukraine’s energy sector. The ‘Energy for the Recovery of Ukraine’ discussion, organised by the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, emphasised the need to leverage Ukraine’s energy potential to enable Europe’s delinking from Russian fossil fuels. As Lithuania’s Minister of Energy, Dainus Kreivys, noted, Ukraine’s energy resources like nuclear, wind, solar, and gas are of strategic importance to the EU because they can replace Russian resources. Ukraine’s gas storage capacity is the third largest in the world after the United States and Russia, far exceeding that of any EU country. Its facilities, originally built during the Soviet era, are much larger than is required to meet Ukraine’s domestic needs. This has made Ukraine a key player in storing gas for Europe in 2023, helping to stabilise prices and generate profits for over a thousand different companies. Ukraine’s favourable customs regime for short-term storage, along with assurances that gas wouldn’t be requisitioned under martial law, has provided additional incentives for traders. Both the EU and the Ukrainian government are eager to capitalise on this.¹⁴

With arable land of 33 million hectares (equal to one-third of all arable land in the EU), Ukraine can replace Russia’s supplies of critical raw materials to the EU and can become Europe’s energy storage hub and electricity provider. Ukraine’s electricity sector was also discussed at length. Kreivys noted that the synchronisation of European-Ukrainian electricity grid signals to the Baltic states (still connected to Russia) that they could also implement this change. A US Bureau of Energy Resources official, Laura Lochman, emphasised that Ukraine’s strong electricity-generation capacity makes it an engine for European growth. De-communisation was invoked in a both a spatial sense – disconnecting from the Soviet grid – and in an economic sense, in terms of the liberalisation of prices and privatisation.

The war has accelerated the implementation of certain energy-privatisation projects that were already in the making before Russia’s invasion in February 2022. For example, green hydrogen production had previously moved slowly due to the Soviet legacy of low retail electricity prices, which had limited investment in the power sector as a whole.¹⁵ Now, however, Ukraine is poised to become a major supplier of green hydrogen to Europe, forming the core of the RePowerEU plan to delink from Russian fossil fuels, and strengthening the position of EU countries in the global race for dominance of renewables.¹⁶ Germany’s H2Global initiative, for example, is a financial instrument that promotes both hydrogen production in the EU and import partnerships with emerging producer countries, as far away as South America. Christine Toetzke, Germany’s Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, hopes Germany can provide enough incentives for the private sector to invest in hydrogen production in Ukraine.

The EU is counting on Ukraine to support a zero-carbon energy transition by developing zero-carbon power generation (nuclear and renewable energy sources) and the GH2 (gaseous hydrogen) system. Together with increasing fossil gas – greenwashed by the EU – and biofuels production, these efforts are part of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. On June 25, 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) up to 2030. The NECP will serve ‘as a blueprint for Ukraine’s green reconstruction and rehabilitation, stimulating assistance from the international community’.¹⁷ The investment needs of the NECP alone will range from US$41.5 billion to US$50 billion.

The de-communisation of Ukraine’s energy sector and production of cheap green energy to support European energy sovereignty and a green transition requires a new relationship between state investment and private (mostly foreign) investment. Accordingly, the topic of attracting private investment, with blended finance and political-risk insurance, was a substantial preoccupation of the ReBuild Ukraine conference. Discussions at the ‘Fit for Ukraine’ Forum on Investment and Transformation, organised by Ukraine Invest, emphasised that Ukraine’s reforms must aim at: (1) increased BPP structures; (2) market liberalisation in the energy sector; (3) public policies aligned to EU standards. These reforms and investments ostensibly support the principles of ‘building back better’ and the institutional capacity of Ukraine’s national and subnational authorities. As the CEO of Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, said: ‘the war, of course, is a tragedy, but it depends on you, how you react to it […] You can say, “Okay, it’s a horrible situation, and we are just victims” – or we can try to build back better, to come back in better shape’.¹⁸ So far, ‘building back better’ has become synonymous with de-risking development, where the Ukrainian state steps in to safeguard and guarantee accumulation, a move towards a market-driven reconstruction that sidelines public welfare and state control in favour of private interests. As Gabor and Sylla explain, ‘(foreign) capital dominates in the state–capital relationship in de-risking developmentalism’.¹⁹

Finance capital and the future of Ukraine

The EU and the US are facilitating the advisory role of foreign finance capital in shaping Ukraine’s political and economic landscape. On February 1, 2024, the European Union set up a Ukraine Facility Plan, which will provide €50 billion to Ukraine by 2027. ²⁰ Coordinated by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the Ukraine Facility aims to implement structural and economic reforms in the public sector, enhance the business climate, foster entrepreneurship, and develop priority sectors for rapid economic growth. Of the €50 billion total, €39 billion will be allocated to the state budget to strengthen macro-financial stability. It further provides for a special investment instrument to cover risks in priority sectors, which will amount to €8 billion. Private investors will be able to receive funding under this instrument through the EBRD, the EIB and other international institutions.²¹

It was not at all surprising that, in his presentation at the ‘Fit for Ukraine’ forum, Christian Syse, Special Representative for Ukraine from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reminded the audience that this war was being fought in part to defend the interests of international financial institutions. Matthias Wyrwoll, the Managing Director of the Financial Markets Advisory (FMA) Group at BlackRock also made a revealing presentation, in which he noted that BlackRock won an award for best support on investment in Ukraine for their new ‘Ukraine Development Fund’ (UDF), promising a new era of development.

In November 2022, BlackRock, JPMorgan and the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding, according to which BlackRock will provide advisory support in the designing of an investment framework for Ukraine’s reconstruction.²² The UDF is set up as a reconstruction bank, to attract private and public capital for implementing large-scale business projects in Ukraine, with over US $500 million in commitments and an estimated future US $1 billion in commitments in ‘catalytic capital’, or investments with higher levels of risk – or as Wyrwoll put it in his presentation in Warsaw, ‘higher risk appetite’. It is important to note here that the Ministry of Economy appointed BlackRock to advise on the launch of the fund free of charge. Clearly, however, that donation is a worthwhile price to pay for the strategic value of a coordinating role. Wyrwoll outlined the five priorities of interest to BlackRock: Ukraine’s infrastructure, energy, manufacturing, agriculture, and IT sectors. The UDF will be based on blended finance, where public capital will ensure de-risking for private capital to support the reconstruction of Ukraine.

Conclusion

The reconstruction industry gathers pace at a time of great uncertainty, as the war continues to drag itself out. Social despair has set in among much of the population – observed in the resistance to forced mobilisation at home and abroad –

and debt-service obligations are coming due, with a potential default on the horizon. As talk of peace negotiations with Russia begins to grow, Ukraine’s energy is becoming a central bargaining chip in its negotiations with Europe and the US, as it attempts to secure continued Western military support and NATO membership. In his recent ‘Victory Plan’, Zelensky announced that the joint protection, investment in, and use of Ukraine’s rich energy resources by its Western partners will provide a significant advantage in global competition. This fourth strategic point in the document contains a secret annex only shared with US and European leaders. It is not coincidental that this Victory Plan was announced three weeks before the 2024 US elections, which will decide Ukraine’s future.

At the conference in Warsaw, Kaare Andreasen, Finance Director at the Export and Investment Fund of Denmark and Counsellor at the Embassy of Denmark to Ukraine, proclaimed from the stage of the ‘Aid and Development Meetup’ that the two major risks to private investment in Ukraine were ‘Russian missiles and nationalisation’. In this scenario of reconstruction as de-risking, the prospect of realising an ‘inclusive’ Ukraine – as pledged at the Lugano conference the previous year – appears highly doubtful. Instead, we are witnessing a structural transformation of another kind. The de-communisation of the Ukrainian energy sector, among other areas of the economy, becomes a form of public-sphere and state-capacity ‘grabbing’ by invitation, involving new ‘development’ projects based on public-private partnerships, which ultimately hinder the formulation of politicised, alternative, progressive strategies for post-war reconstruction. When finance capital drives structural transformations like the green transition, its primary focus remains on profit rather than human welfare or development, even when framed as a ‘Green Marshall Plan’ amid the largest conflict in Europe since World War II.

___

Este artigo faz parte do dossiê de Transição Energética a ser lançado em março de 2025.

NOTAS DE RODAPÉ

1
Lugano, 2022
2
The World Bank. 2024. ‘Press Release: Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released’. The World Bank, February 15.
3
Gabor, D. (2021) ‘The Wall Street Consensus’, Development and Change 52(3): 429–59.
4
Tony Wood, Matrix of War, NLR 133 134, January April 2022
5
Steven L. Solnick. 1998. Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 7.
6
Åslund, A. (2009). How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, March.
7
Leonid Kuchma’s role as Director of the Yuzhmashe (Yuzhnoye Machine Building Plant) in Dnipropetrovsk was pivotal in shaping his connections to the Soviet military-industrial complex, and later his influence in post-Soviet Ukraine. The Dnipro oligarchs, including those with ties to Yuzhmashe, gained substantial economic power, as they capitalised on the privatisation of state assets, including the defence industry enterprises like Yuzhmashe.
8
Volodymyr Ishchenko and Oleg Zhuravlev. 2021. ‘How Maidan Revolutions Reproduce and Intensify the Post-Soviet Crisis of Political Representation’, PONARS: Eurasia Policy Memo No. 714, October.
9
Gabor, D. (2021a) ‘The Wall Street Consensus’, Development and Change 52(3): 429–59.
10
Elborgh-Woytek, K., & Lewis, M. W. (2002). Privatization in Ukraine: Challenges of Assessment and Coverage in Fund Conditionality. IMF Policy Discussion Papers, 2002(007), A001.
11
Andrian Prokip. 2024. ‘The State of Ukraine’s Energy Sector after Ten Years of War’. Wilson Center, Focus Ukraine, February 8.
12
European Commission. 2023. Ukraine 2023 Report. November 8, 120-121.
13
See the exhibition’s official website: https://rebuildukraine.in.ua/en/post-event-materials-2.0
14
The Economist. 2024. ‘The Ukraine war offers energy arbitrage opportunities’. The Economist, February 15.
15
Marco Rudolf, Valentyn Bondaruk, Kilian Crone. 2021. ‘Green Hydrogen in Ukraine: Taking Stock and Outlining Pathways’. German Energy Agency, June.
16
European Commission. 2023. ‘Joint statement by Commissioner Simson and German Minister Habeck on energy issues’. News Announcement, May 31.
17
Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. 2024. ‘Ukraine approves National Energy and Climate Plan on the day of the start of EU accession negotiations’. Government Portal, June 25s
18
David L. Stern. 2023. ‘Russia destroyed Ukraine’s energy sector, so it’s being rebuilt green’. The Washington Post, July 5.
19
Gabor, D., & Sylla, N. S. (2023). ‘Derisking developmentalism: A tale of green hydrogen’. Development and Change, 54(5), 1169-1196
20
Ministry of the Economy of Ukraine. 2024. ‘News: European Council backs EUR 50 billion financing for Ukraine, paving way for further approval of Ukraine Facility’. Government of Ukraine, February 1.
21
Ministry of the Economy of Ukraine. 2024. ‘News: European Council backs EUR 50 billion financing for Ukraine, paving way for further approval of Ukraine Facility’. Government of Ukraine, February 1.
22
This was an initiative announced at the Ukraine Recovery Conference, London, on the 21^st and 22^ndof June, 2023.

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Olena Lyubchenko

Olena Lyubchenko is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at York University, Toronto, and an associate faculty member at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Her research and teaching draws on Marxist critique of political economy and focuses on social reproduction, primitive accumulation, and the making and transformation of the Soviet Union in global context. She writes about neoliberal restructuring, the financialisation of social reproduction, racialisation and citizenship in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, as well as the regulation of labour relations in settler-colonial Canada. Olena is an editor at LeftEast and Midnight Sun Magazine. She is a co-editor of the volume Change and Continuity: Canadian Political Economy in the New Millennium (McGill-Queens, 2019).