Introduction

The challenge facing the world since the Paris Agreement in 2015 is gigantic: to limit the increase in global temperature to 2.0°C, preferably 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels. To reach this target, according to IPCC data, world emissions will have to be halved by 2030, and full      carbon-neutrality achieved by 2050. 

Countries have been implementing actions in the three areas recommended by the IPCC: the carbon market, energy efficiency, and new technologies. Like many countries, Brazil has seen a significant increase in the installation of so-called energy-transition projects, especially large wind and solar power plants. However, in addition to actions taken by state agents and the business sector, alternative projects, of a popular and territorial nature, have also emerged.¹Since 2003, social-environmental struggles have begun to prioritise the defence of land and territory, referred to by Svampa as the ‘ ecoterritorial turn’. Svampa, M. The frontiers of neo-extractivism in Latin America: socio-environmental conflicts, the ecoterritorial turn and new dependencies. Trad. Lígia Azevedo, São Paulo: Elefante, 2019 

These projects have sought to counter the dominant model of energy production through greater decentralisation, participatory and democratic processes, transparency, lowered environmental impacts, and guarantees of employment and income for the localities where the projects are installed. They offer a qualified alternative to community management, especially in the face of a history of state energy investments that has largely favoured megaprojects and public-private partnerships, despite the negative socio-environmental impacts those approaches have consistently entailed.

The myth of the energy transition

Despite the accelerated growth of renewables in Brazil in recent years, it should be noted that the incorporation of these sources into the energy matrix has been complementary to, rather than a substitute for, fossil fuels. Oil and gas production in Brazil have grown and are projected to continue growing over the coming years, with new exploration frontiers announced, in the Amazon and pre-salt oil fields, as well as moves towards advanced technologies such as fracking.

According to the Energy Balance (EPE) 2023, 47% of Brazil’s energy use comes from renewables, compared to the world average of 14%. If we consider only the electricity matrix, the share is even higher. According to data from the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL), in May 2024 renewables accounted for 85% of the matrix, with hydroelectric (54%) and wind (15%) the main sources, against 15 % from non-renewables, mainly natural gas used in thermoelectric plants.

As far as wind power is concerned, Brazil ranks 6^th in the world in installed capacity, at approximately 30 gigawatts (15%).² Brazilian Wind Energy and New Technologies Association (ABEEOLICA). Infovento – Data bulletin. Issue 34, March 2024 The Brazilian Wind Energy Association estimates that the installed capacity of wind power will reach around 55 GW by 2030. The big news in the wind sector is the expected start of offshore energy generation. In April 2024, 97 projects were being analysed by the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). If all of these are approved, there will be approximately 15,500 new wind turbines      off the Brazilian coast, providing 234 GW of installed capacity. Thus, the energy-generation capacity expected from offshore plants alone is greater than the entire installed capacity in Brazil as of January 2024 (approximately 198 GW, from all energy sources, including hydroelectric plants).

Solar energy exists in Brazil under the centralised model of large plants (12.8 GW), but also through small power stations installed close to consumer units. This mode is called decentralised generation and has seen significant growth in recent years, with around 28.9 GW of installed capacity by May 2024.

These figures are significant; if we analysed them out of context, we might infer that a major energy transition was underway in Brazil. However, in the last five years, R$334.6 billion in subsidies have been granted to fossil fuels. Renewable energies, on the other hand, received only R$60.1 billion in the same period.³Institute for Socio-Economic Studies (INESC). Subsidies for fossil and renewable sources (2018-2022). Executive summary. Brasilia, December 2023. In 2022, for example, only R$2.8 billion was provided to incentivise the installation of photovoltaic panels through subsidies associated with distributed generation (DG), according to data from the INESC survey. After strong pressure from large energy companies, which saw themselves as disadvantaged by the significant increase in decentralised generation, the government approved the Legal Framework for Distributed Microgeneration and Mini-generation and started charging, from 2023, for the use of the distribution infrastructure from the concessionaire to the final destination, making that approach more expensive and discouraging its use by small energy producers. 

Also in 2023, the current Brazilian government announced the “New PAC” (Growth Acceleration Programme), with around R$1.7 trillion in resources for a range of projects throughout the country, including   an ‘energy transition and security’      category. The New PAC’s resources for renewables are considerable: R$22 billion for wind power and R$39 billion for photovoltaics. However, these are derisory compared to the investments planned for the ‘oil and gas’ category of the same programme, which are approximately R$387 billion     , around five times more than the amounts planned for renewables. Public policy only aims to diversify the matrix, increasing the use of wind and solar power, but also of non-renewable resources. In fact, the forecast in the National Energy Plan 2050 is to ‘maintain Brazil as a major producer of hydrocarbons’, with a production target of 5.5 billion barrels per day (almost double current production).

To make a radical transformation of the energy matrix viable, something more than just the goodwill of the business sector is needed: direct action by state agents, with policies to incentivise renewables and discourage non-renewables. This is not what we have seen. We need a change of perspective in public policies and bolder and braver actions: reducing incentives for the hydrocarbon industry, with an equivalent and gradual increase for the renewable industry.

Renewables and their territorial implications

In addition to the contradiction of expanding fossil fuels alongside a stimulus for renewables, the Brazilian case has other characteristics that can help us understand challenges related to renewable-energy infrastructure around the world. In some European countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Germany, France and Belgium, there is concern about the installation of renewable-energy projects and impacts such as changes to the landscape, the death of birds and bats, and possible effects on human health due to noise from wind turbines.

This is also the case in Brazil, but with some specificities. The majority of wind and solar mega-projects in Brazil are installed in sensitive socio-environmental regions, either close to or overlapping Permanent Protection Areas (PPAs), such as dunes, sandbanks, mangroves and Conservation Units, as well as in Indigenous, Quilombola,⁴Quilombolas are Afro-Brazilian residents of quilombo settlements, settlements first established by enslaved Afro-Brazilians who escaped from the slave plantations that existed in Brazil until abolition in 1888. and traditional communal territories. What’s more, unlike some European countries, there is no specific legislation or standard regulating the minimum distance between homes and wind turbines to ensure the safety of local populations, which further increases the vulnerability of the communities located near these large projects.

As a result, the construction of wind farms in the Northeastern region of Brazil (comprising over 90% of the national total) has significantly altered the ecological and morphological characteristics of coastal ecosystems such as sandbanks, mangroves and dune fields. In addition to the negative impacts on the environment, the socio-cultural reproduction of local populations is deeply affected, jeopardising their way of life, their sources of income, subsistence and leisure.⁵LIMA, J. A. G. A natureza contraditória da geração de energia eólica no Nordeste do Brasil. Fortaleza: Editora da Uece, 202; Ramirez, J.; Gorayeb, A.; Nascimento, J. L. Winds of Change: Conflict, Culture and Sustainability in the Cumbe Community. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School (CBS), 2023. Araujo, J. C. H; Souza, W. F.; Meireles, A. J.; Brannstrom, C. “Sustainability Challenges of Wind Power Deployment in Coastal Ceará State, Brazil”, Sustainability, v. 12, n. 14, 2020.

The constant process of labour migration during the installation phase of the projects and its subsequent effects also poses major problems, according to residents. During the period when the plants were installed, social problems in the communities worsened, such as drug abuse, an increase in sexual exploitation, violence against women, and unwanted teenage pregnancies. The children born to young people in this context have been dubbed ‘children of the wind’      by the locals, in reference to cases in which temporary workers have returned to their hometowns without assuming paternity.

There is also opposition to offshore wind farms. Research shows that offshore wind farms can cause economic damage to fishing activities for various reasons, such as spatial exclusion, difficulty in navigation, and a reduction in fish stocks. ⁶Xavier, T. W. F.; Gorayreb, A.; Brannstrom, C. “Offshore wind farms as an energy frontier? Impacts and synergies with socio-environmental aspects and fishing activity in Northeast Brazil”, Revista Brasileira de Energia, v. 29, n. 3, 3o trim. 2023 Effective action, with reference to concepts of energy justice, is needed to mitigate these losses, especially in the context of environmental licensing.

Solar energy involves similar risks. In the state of Ceará, for example, 17 projects for concentrated photovoltaic energy generation were being analysed by the environmental agency in January 2023. The suppression of vegetation from these projects totalled almost 11,000 hectares of Caatinga, the region’s main biome, exclusively Brazilian and already heavily threatened by mining and deforestation activities.

It is essential that public policies for energy transition take into account aspects beyond the economic dimension or the simple reduction of greenhouse gases. State planning for the sector must consider, above all, the social and environmental impacts of these new infrastructures and undertakings, and must ensure the protection of ecosystems and biomes, as well as guaranteeing the effective integration of communities in decision-making processes, and the promotion of environmental justice in the territories.

Distributed Generation of Social Interest: Brazilian examples

The Distributed Generation of Social Interest (DGSI) model is one response to a status quo that tends toward false solutions and unfair approaches to energy transition. Such initiatives recognise the role of state planning in coordinating the transition and promoting investments and are intended as complementary to large-scale renewable infrastructure that generates more social and energy gains at a lower cost. But distributed generation is also a method of denying and counteracting the privatisation of electricity management, even as the political horizon of reverting to a totally publicly owned electricity system remains distant. These programmes question the logic of public-private partnerships that still dominates the world’s energy production sector, by enacting the perspectives of energy democracy and community empowerment.     

Distributed generation offers a number of benefits, such as a reduction in energy losses, quicker implementation times, a low environmental impact, a reduction in network load, greater reliability, and an increase in energy diversity. It is positive for the local economy and the population, encouraging a more sustainable attitude and promoting the empowerment of the end consumer.⁷Walker, G. What are the barriers and incentives for community-owned means of energy production and use? Energy Policy, v. 36, n. 12, p. 4401-4405, 2008. Despite these advantages, this model does not seek to completely replace concentrated energy generation. Large plants will still be needed to guarantee energy security and stabilise grid production, especially to supply large urban centres, industries and the transport sector. The concentrated mode is important because it guarantees the contracting and subsequent distribution of a large amount of energy at a given time, which would be technically unfeasible with decentralised projects alone. However, it is up to the state to regulate the sector more, with the aim of increasing the contracting of renewable sources in the next energy auctions and reducing the contracting of fossil fuels. 

Current regulations in Brazil give energy consumers who have the financial resources the freedom to opt for distributed generation. To avoid further entrenching inequalities, however, it is necessary to go one step further      and allow this energy source to reach the most precarious population and those most threatened by energy poverty. With this in mind, RevoluSolar has established the term “Distributed Generation of Social Interest” to designate the application of this type of energy generation under certain conditions, specifically for low-income populations, families and consumers, with a view to social and environmental justice. Below are three cases of solar energy generation in Brazil from the perspective of DGSI.

1. RevoluSolar – bringing solar power to Rio’s favelas

RevoluSolar is an NGO set up in October 2015 with the aim of producing electricity from photovoltaic panels and to guarantee      low-income people access to sustainable electricity at a lower cost. The first installations were made in 2016 in Morro da Babilônia, a favela located in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, in two commercial developments.  In 2018, a community school received solar energy installed by the residents themselves, who were trained as solar electricians. In addition to installing photovoltaic plants in the communities, the project seeks to provide professional training for the local population, training installers and electricians, as well as organising workshops and cultural events with the aim of raising awareness and engaging the community in the issue of climate change. The co-operative and associative nature of RevoluSolar is able to guarantee the technical and economic viability of its projects, as well as galvanise communities. These characteristics guarantee a reduction in the price of the equipment and the shared utilisation of the installation surface, since not all residents have adequate surface area, among other advantages. In 2021 a shared solar energy generation system was installed on the roof of the Babilônia Residents’ Association, and new installations were made in nearby Morro do Chapéu Mangueira. Since then, the project has expanded to favelas in other parts of the city, such as Complexo da Maré, and also to São Paulo, Amazonas, and other states. 

2. Veredas Sol e Lares – MAB and the first floating solar plant

In March 2023, the Veredas Sol e Lares project completed the implementation of a floating solar power plant      in the semi-arid region of the state of Minas Gerais. The initiative was conceived by the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB), together with university research groups, local companies, and NGOs, and made possible through a project with Aneel (the National Electricity Agency). The floating photovoltaic plant, considered to be the largest in Latin America, is installed in the reservoir of a Small Hydroelectric Plant (SHP), and produces energy to reduce the cost of electricity for approximately 1,250 families. In addition, the plant is managed by the Minas Gerais Distributed Generation Prosumers Association –      Veredas Sol e Lares,⁸The term “prosumer” means that members are both producers and consumers of the generated electricity (Silva & Queiro, 2022). Silva, N. G; Queiroz, T. B. (coord.). A Usina Solar Veredas Sol e Lares. Minas Gerais, 2022. which made up of families impacted by the hydroelectric dam. The association’s focus is the popular and social management of the plant, within the shared generation mode. It has been able to deliver energy to many consumer units in the territory it covers, and also to change the meaning of the reservoir of the dam itself, from a space of marginalisation to one of support.     

The conclusion of the project was the result of MAB’s historic demands, representing an important victory for the movement. In 2018, MAB negotiated a term of commitment with the government that defined the details of the project, including social research and a local and regional development plan, based on broad popular participation. ⁹Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB), 2023. Veredas Sol e Lares brings unprecedented progress in building a popular energy model for Brazil.

1.  The Solar Bakery in Paraíba – cakes and breads powered by the sun

The semi-arid region of the Northeastern state of Paraiba has seen a number of solar energy initiatives implemented for family farming, agro-industry, food production, water pumping, buildings and public lighting, among uses. These activities are the responsibility of the Semi-Arid Renewable Energy Committee (CERSA), which was set up in 2014 with the participation of civil society organisations, academics and government representatives. One of the projects supported by CERSA is the ‘solar bakery’, started in 2016. This enterprise is managed by a group of around women, who are in the process of achieving social and economic autonomy. As well as empowering these women and generating income, the Solar Bakery has been a space for political organising in the areas of climate, nature, and energy production.

According to researcher Fabrina Furtado, the Solar Bakery’s system (currently of 12 solar panels) generates enough energy to supply all its activities and even produce an energy reserve.¹⁰Furtado, Fabrina, Renewable energy in communities in Brazil: conflicts and resistance, Fabrina Furtado. — 1. ed. — São Paulo: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2021. This reserve is fed into the state grid and the positive balance is either used to offset consumption in subsequent months, or kept as a credit, following Aneel’s regulatory guidelines. This directly benefited more than 100 families of rural workers, forming the beginning of a community agro-industry. The enterprise produces cakes, biscuits, bread, toast, among others, with a weekly production of approximately 600kg of products, 400kg of which are passed on to the municipality through the National School Feeding Policy (PNAE), the rest being sold in the community and at local fairs.

For a just, inclusive and popular energy transition (TEJIP)¹¹In this article I have adopted the term ‘TEJIP’, which comes from social movements in the energy sector. In order to be just, the transition must not generate more poverty, social or environmental injustice, or violate the rights of people and nature, but must function as an instrument for eradicating poverty and promoting social, environmental and energy justice. In order to be inclusive, it must           include women, young people, and traditional and peripheral urban populations in decision-making and management spaces, in order to avoid projects, works and actions that have an unfavourable impact on them. And it must be carried out in a popular way, with decisions supported by the participation of civil- society groups and organisations working on the energy issue. For more information, see the letter from the National Seminar ‘The Energy Transition We Want: Fair, Popular’.

The factors that produce social inequalities are the same as those that generate environmental degradation; both are related to the capitalist mode of production, with the harm falling more directly on vulnerable populations.¹²Bullard, R. D. Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. Boston: South End Press, 1983. The ‘energy transition’ underway in Brazil, based on large wind and solar projects, exploits people, especially women, people of colour, indigenous people and traditional populations, as well as nature itself.

 Civil- society organisations, trade unions, political parties, researchers and other groups need to take a firm stance in favour of an energy transition that is fair, inclusive and popular. This transition must be democratic and based upon the direct participation of the populations affected by the projects, the protection of ecosystems, and the guarantee of human rights. It      is not enough just to have more renewable-energy projects in the matrix, if these projects are installed under the same conditions of environmental racism as non-renewable energy projects.

 In addition to the expropriations, conflicts, and losses involved in the energy transition, there is also resistance and collective struggle. The challenge is enormous but involves a great opportunity for promoting popular participation in decision-making about the country’s energy future. The Distributed Generation of Social Interest experiences described here help to combat climate change while at the same time supporting the social interests of local populations, and the maintenance of living ecosystems. They also encourage us to think about electricity production in a way that goes beyond emission substitution metrics, towards a broader and more radical transition – because preventing a planetary climate collapse requires a transformation in the way we relate to the world, in the way we interact   with each other as humans, and in the way we relate to non-human beings and nature.

___

This article is part of the Energy Transition dossier to be launched in March 2025.

FOOTNOTES

• 1
  Since 2003, social-environmental struggles have begun to prioritise the defence of land and territory, referred to by Svampa as the ‘ ecoterritorial turn’. Svampa, M. The frontiers of neo-extractivism in Latin America: socio-environmental conflicts, the ecoterritorial turn and new dependencies. Trad. Lígia Azevedo, São Paulo: Elefante, 2019
• 2
   Brazilian Wind Energy and New Technologies Association (ABEEOLICA). Infovento – Data bulletin. Issue 34, March 2024
• 3
  Institute for Socio-Economic Studies (INESC). Subsidies for fossil and renewable sources (2018-2022). Executive summary. Brasilia, December 2023.
• 4
  Quilombolas are Afro-Brazilian residents of quilombo settlements, settlements first established by enslaved Afro-Brazilians who escaped from the slave plantations that existed in Brazil until abolition in 1888.
• 5
  LIMA, J. A. G. A natureza contraditória da geração de energia eólica no Nordeste do Brasil. Fortaleza: Editora da Uece, 202; Ramirez, J.; Gorayeb, A.; Nascimento, J. L. Winds of Change: Conflict, Culture and Sustainability in the Cumbe Community. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School (CBS), 2023. Araujo, J. C. H; Souza, W. F.; Meireles, A. J.; Brannstrom, C. “Sustainability Challenges of Wind Power Deployment in Coastal Ceará State, Brazil”, Sustainability, v. 12, n. 14, 2020.
• 6
  Xavier, T. W. F.; Gorayreb, A.; Brannstrom, C. “Offshore wind farms as an energy frontier? Impacts and synergies with socio-environmental aspects and fishing activity in Northeast Brazil”, Revista Brasileira de Energia, v. 29, n. 3, 3o trim. 2023
• 7
  Walker, G. What are the barriers and incentives for community-owned means of energy production and use? Energy Policy, v. 36, n. 12, p. 4401-4405, 2008.
• 8
  The term “prosumer” means that members are both producers and consumers of the generated electricity (Silva & Queiro, 2022). Silva, N. G; Queiroz, T. B. (coord.). A Usina Solar Veredas Sol e Lares. Minas Gerais, 2022.
• 9
  Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB), 2023. Veredas Sol e Lares brings unprecedented progress in building a popular energy model for Brazil.
• 10
  Furtado, Fabrina, Renewable energy in communities in Brazil: conflicts and resistance, Fabrina Furtado. — 1. ed. — São Paulo: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2021.
• 11
  In this article I have adopted the term ‘TEJIP’, which comes from social movements in the energy sector. In order to be just, the transition must not generate more poverty, social or environmental injustice, or violate the rights of people and nature, but must function as an instrument for eradicating poverty and promoting social, environmental and energy justice. In order to be inclusive, it must           include women, young people, and traditional and peripheral urban populations in decision-making and management spaces, in order to avoid projects, works and actions that have an unfavourable impact on them. And it must be carried out in a popular way, with decisions supported by the participation of civil- society groups and organisations working on the energy issue. For more information, see the letter from the National Seminar ‘The Energy Transition We Want: Fair, Popular’.
• 12
  Bullard, R. D. Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. Boston: South End Press, 1983.